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Abstract—The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has got the interest
of different research bodies as a promising technology. IoV is
mainly developed to reduce the number of crashes by enabling
vehicles to sense the environment and spread their locations
to the neighborhood via safety-beacons to enhance the system
functioning. Nevertheless, a bunch of security and privacy threats
are looming; by exploiting the spatio-data included in these
beacons. A lot of privacy schemes were developed to cope with
the problem like CAPS, CPN, RSP and SLOW. The schemes
provide a certain level of location privacy yet the strength of
the adversary, e.g., the number of eavesdropping stations, has
not been fully considered. In this paper we aim at investigating
the effect of the adversary’s eavesdropping stations number and
position on the overall system functioning via privacy and QoS
metrics. We also show the performances of these schemes in a
manhattan-grid model which gives a comparison between the
used schemes. The results show that both the number and the
emplacement of the eavesdropping stations have a real negative
impact on the achieved location privacy of the IoV users.
Keywords—Location privacy, pseudonym change strategies,
eavesdropping attack, IoV, VANETs
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
By leveraging the diverse sensors and communication
technologies, IoV is considered to be the most fitting research
axis that ensures safety, road management and entertainment
for the car users by exploiting the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)
technology [1] that is in the rollout phase. IoV uses the
high sensing abilities provided by the inter-components that
are embedded in the cars in order to get a better environ-
mental awareness that is next spread to the neighborhood.
Additionally, the V2X technology makes it easy for vehicles to
communicate with heterogeneous networks and devices. Fig. 1
describes the emerging IoV paradigm.
Fig. 1: The V2X communications of sensor equipped cars
B. Problematic and Research Motivation
Although V2X allows vehicles to prevent accidents, traffic
jams and other road-related issues, much security and privacy
efforts are needed [2]. Since vehicles share their locations in
periodic beacons for the sake of safety, collecting such data
becomes an easy task for the non-authorized entities. This
data collection does only necessitate the possession of one
or more eavesdropping stations. Since vehicles are meant to
broadcast beacons with a range of 300m [3], creating a full
eavesdropping area would be possible by malicious persons
and/or colluding organizations; that is the Global Passive Ad-
versary (GPA) [4]. The effect of the adversary’s eavesdropping
stations amount and emplacement have a serious impact on
the achieved location privacy level of the car users since it978-1-7281-6445-8/20/$31.00 ©2020 IEEE
determines the amount of collected data.
C. Contributions and Paper Organization
This paper does contribute with the following:
- Comparing a set of well-known privacy schemes on a
manhattan-grid created model under diverse densities
using privacy and QoS metrics.
- Investigating the adversary’s power effect on those pri-
vacy schemes by varying the eavesdropping stations’
number (the adversary’s coverage mode).
- Illustrating the adversary’s used approach in the differ-
ent coverage modes (from collecting beacons to paths
building and storing).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section
II, we shed light on a set of well-known privacy techniques
used to deal with the location privacy problem. Next, we
describe the network and threat models in section III. Then,
we illustrate the adversary’s approach and explain the different
used metrics in section IV. After that, we proceed to the
performances analysis in section V. Section VI is consecrated
for discussing the results and giving future work. Finally, we
conclude this study in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this last two decades, the problem of location privacy got
much attention and research efforts [5]. The common solution
was to use pseudo-identifiers (pseudonyms) while beaconing
and changing them from time to time, yet, the exact location
included in the beacons introduces a real weakness (e.g., the
pseudonyms linking attacks).
In the context of wireless LANs, Huang et al. introduced
the concept of silent period [6] that is defined as a short
period of time where no communications take part before using
another network identifier. The same idea was used but in the
vehicular context by Buttya´n et al. in their scheme named
SLOW [7]. SLOW aims at letting vehicles inter silence when
their speeds are low as in such a case the risk of crashes
is low, thus, no big safety-related issues. Vehicles change
their pseudonyms by then to confuse the attacker. However,
even in low speeds, using the silent periods would bring the
safety-privacy trade-off [8] which is inconsistent with the
standardization efforts.
Lu et al. employed the social spots aspect in [9]. A social
spot is an area where vehicles gather more frequently, thus, has
high densities such as intersections, parking lots, etc. Changing
pseudonyms here generates more confusion to the attacker.
Another work is that of Babaghayou et al. [10] where they
highlighted the issue of determining the leaving event of a
person residing in a specific district. They showed the scenario
of an adversary who is monitoring the entrance of the district
by a radio station. They also suggested to cease beaconing in
a scheme called EPP while on the district (since there is no
high crash probability in the district). The details of the study
were explained more in [11].
Pan and Li provide the Cooperative pseudonym change
scheme (CPN) [12]. As the anonymity of vehicles is not neces-
sarily guarantied since the attacker can observe the individual
Fig. 2: The supposed network and threat model
pseudonym change, CPN aims at making a synchronized
pseudonym change by the neighboring vehicles. When there
is k neighbors who are ready to cooperate, the vehicle can
engage in the pseudonym change process. The results showed
a high anonymity by increasing the parameter k.
Emmara et al. proposed the Context-Aware Privacy Scheme
(CAPS) [13] that lets vehicles choose the right context to
enter silence then change their pseudonyms. This is done by
monitoring the neighborhood by the vehicles in order to choose
that right context. CAPS gave good results in terms of privacy
and QoS metrics.
Additionally, Emmara et al. apply the silent period mecha-
nism of [6] to provide the Random Silent Period (RSP) scheme
[14]. The principle of RSP consists of entering silence for a
random range of time then performing the pseudonym change.
The scheme is considered as a spatial mix-zone type.
In a context other than the location privacy, Schoch et
al. shed light on the drawbacks resulting from the intense
pseudonym changes on the network performances plus the
geo-routing [15]. Indeed, they found that this high pseudonym
change frequency affects negatively the network performances.
Thus, researchers should take this constraint into consideration
while developing their own location privacy schemes.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, the assumed network and threat models are
presented. This is shown in Fig. 2, that contains the following
entities:
A. Network Model
1) Vehicles: They are the basis of the Vehicular Ad-
hod Network (VANET) paradigm that provides a platform
to V2X applications. They can, by then, communicate us-
ing the 802.11p standard and perform Vehicle to Vehicle
(V2V) communications. The set of vehicles is defined as
S = {v1, v2, ...vn} where n is the total number of vehicles.
2) Authorities: The authority is the law-side entity(s)
that has various roles like: distributing, issuing, revoking
pseudonyms, etc. It is also supposed not to be malicious
the law-side entities are, generally, believed to be honest
(trusted). Pseudonym-related operations do introduce resources
and network communications consumption, thus, the less such
operations are executed, the more the system is optimal while
always keeping the functioning requirements.
Fig. 3: The used approach in the adversary’s point of view
3) Infrastructure: Composed by a set of stations that rely
and facilitate the connectivity between the different network
entities where the most interesting feature here is the Vehicle
to Infrastructure (V2I) communications.
B. Threat Model
1) Attacker: Also known as the adversary, this element
aims at executing a bunch of attacks for his own benefit and
reason. The attacker’s resources determine what can he be able
to do; as the more resources he has, the more menacing his
techniques will be.
2) Eavesdropping station: The units used by the attacker
to expand his vision and coverage on the monitored area. Such
components are not easily detectable as they are inactive and
exploits the wireless medium vulnerabilities.
3) Attacker resources: The different servers, databases
and computing devices that treat the collected data obtained
from the IoV users. Such resources can also be in a software
nature like the tracking algorithms and approaches, the location
prediction applications, etc.
IV. THE USED APPROACH AND EFFECTIVENESS METRICS
For the used approach, which is in fact an adversary-side
approach, we are interested in the beacons collection phase
where we propose to vary the number and the emplacement of
the eavesdropping stations as illustrated in Fig. 3. Afterwards,
the collected beacons will be an input for the other two phases;
namely: (a) tracking methodes and algorithms and (b) paths
building and data storing.
Furthermore, in order to evaluate a scheme, a set of metrics
must be taken depending on the aimed evaluation. Thus, the
(1) traceability, (2) QoS and (3) eavesdropping successfulness
metrics are used and explained as follows:
A. Traceability Metric
Which is considered as a location privacy metric and is
defined as the correctness of reconstructing the vehicle’s traces
from its broadcasted beacons by the adversary [16].
B. QoS Metrics
They are the metrics that concern the overall functioning
of the network and have features like the communication
overhead, resources consumption, computational time, etc. We,
specifically, take the following metrics:
1) Pseudonyms consumption: performing a pseudonym
change results in consuming the set of pseudonyms (i.e.,
resources) stored in the vehicle which triggers a pseudonym-
refill process that, consequently, necessitates network overhead
consumption. Thus, few changes are more preferred.
2) Generated beacons: It is the total number of generated
beacons and has some negative effects on the network like
packet collisions.
3) Verified signatures: The number of signature verifi-
cations has a big impact on consuming the computational
resources and may not be friendly to some of the real-time
applications (e.g., safety-related applications).
C. Eavesdropping Successfulness Metric
This metric is categorized in the adversary-side considera-
tion. Maximizing the amount of gathered beacons comes into
the adversary’s favor as these beacons can be treated next to
not just infer the target’s series of coordinates but his social
interactions, driving behavior, etc.
V. PERFORMANCES ANALYSIS
A. Simulation Setup
In order to evaluate the different privacy schemes via the
set of metrics and using the approach defined in section IV, the
establishment of a manhattan-grid model is done. The model is
generated using the NETEDIT tool where the parameters are
given in details in Table I, which also gives details on how the
mobility is generated. We use SUMO [17] that is considered
as one of the best and certified mobility simulators. The way
we insert vehicles in the network follows the Randomtrips.py
script included in SUMO using the formula: ((t1 − t0)/n)
where t1 and t0 are the ending and starting of insertion
interval and n is the number of vehicles. We take the first total
interval time in order to ensure a better vehicles density and the
remaining half is set for letting vehicles quite the simulation
(also as described in Table I).
Concerning the network simulator, we employ Omnet++
[18]; the component c++ based discrete events simulator.
Omnet++ allows a set of rich frameworks like Veins [19];
the vehicular network simulator that acts as a bridge between
the mobility (SUMO) and the network (Omnet++) simulators.
For a more specific aim (privacy), the PREXT extension [14]
developed by Emmara et al. is used. PREXT integrates a set of
location privacy schemes in addition to a set of privacy metrics
such as the traceability [16]. Basing on PREXT, the paper’s
study is conducted via various evaluations and by modifying
the tracker module of PREXT to compute the distinct received
beacons (used next for the eavesdropped beacons metric).
TABLE I: Used simulation setup, parameters and values
Parameters Value
Ne
tw
or
k Transmission range 300(m) radius
Beaconing interval 1(s)
Standard 80211p
M
ob
ilit
y
Vehicles number Inter-Arrival=3;1.5;1;0.75
Generated=50,100,150,200
Insertion method First half of the total
simulation time insertion
Mobility model RandomTrips.py script
En
vir
on
me
nt
Used map Manhattan-grid model
4 intersected roads with
boundary-attached segments
200(m) per segment
Map size 1000*1000(m*m)
1(kmˆ2)
Simulation time 300(s)
Ev
alu
ati
on
Privacy metrics Traceability
QoS Pseudonyms consumption
Sent beacons
Verified signatures
Collected beacons Obtained distinct beacons
Sc
he
me
s
CAPS Min-Psd-lifetime=60(s)
Max-Psd-lifetime=180(s)
Min-Silent-Time=3(s)
Max-Silent-Time=13(s)
Num-Silent-Neighbors=1(veh)
Neighborhood-thrshld=50(m)
CPN Neighbors-radius=100(m)
Neighbors-threshold=2(veh)
RSP Psd-lifetime=60(s)
Min-Silent-Time=3(s)
Max-Silent-Time=11(s)
SLOW Speed-thrshld=8(m/s)
Silence-thrshl=5(s)
B. Simulation Results
The simulations are conducted in perspective of the diverse
metrics and their obtained results are listed as follows:
1) The achieved traceability: The most important metric is
that of the location privacy; the traceability. Fig. 4 presents
the achieved traceability where it is apparent that (1) with
the increasing of vehicles, the adversary lost some treacability
percentage in one hand and (2) SLOW followed by RSP
gave the best privacy level, we do argue this by the nature
of the silent period mechanism that results in hiding the
vehicles’ whereabouts from the adversary. Then came CAPS
followed by CPN since CAPS does not use much silent periods
compared to SLOW and RSP while CPN only focuses on the
cooperative pseudonym change and that is why it got some
enhancement while increasing the number of vehicles.
2) The consumption of pseudonyms: For the pseudonym
consumption, Fig. 5 shows that CAPS came in the first place
as it optimizes the number of pseudonym changes. The reason
behind this is that CAPS finds out the best opportunity to
execute the pseudonym change without unnecessary changes to
avoid additional communications with the pseudonym issuing
authority(s). Then came SLOW followed by RSP and both
schemes base on the silent period mechanism that is followed
by the pseudonym change. Lastly came the CPN scheme with
Fig. 4: The achieved traceability by the different schemes
Fig. 5: The number of pseudonym changes resulting from the
different schemes
an extreme number of pseudonym changes, it so natural since
CPN considers the number of k neighbors (that are willing to
change their pseudonyms) to be the trigger and as k is set to 2
(the default parameter), that is why it happened to be a lot of
pseudonym changes. Additionally, the increasing of vehicles
implied an increasing in the number of pseudonym changes.
3) The number of generated beacons: The second QoS
metric consists of the total number of generated and sent
beacons and is shown in Fig. 6. The less beacons gener-
ating scheme is SLOW followed by RSP, CAPS and CPN
respectively. The reason is the same as with the treacability
metric due to the use of the silent period mechanism. Another
observation is that beacons generation had increased in a quasi-
linear way when increasing the number of vehicles because
SLOW uses more silence times compared to the other three
schemes. These last ones, expectedly, got a fast increasing in
the beacons generation number.
4) The amount of verified signatures: The last QoS metric
is the total amount of verified signatures. Fig. 7 shows the
exponential increasing of the received beacons, in other words,
verifying their signatures. This is because beacons are sent
in a broadcast manner resulting in receiving the packets by
many vehicles depending on the density. Also, SLOW kept
Fig. 6: The number of sent beacons by the different schemes
Fig. 7: The number of verified beacon signatures after using
the different schemes
the leading by its fewer verified signatures due to the few
beacons generation by this scheme. With the same reasoning,
RSP, CAPS and CPN came afterwards in that order.
5) The eavesdropped beacons: There always exist a bunch
of attacks following the preliminary eavesdropping attack,
thus, the amount of gathered beacons does count for the
adversary. Table II shows the number of obtained beacon
packets and their percentage to the total number of distinct
sent beacon packets for the three coverage modes, namely:
full, moderate and low. Obviously, the adversary achieved
the peak by a 100% of obtained beacons while covering the
whole map (full coverage) with stations that took the 300m
of vehicles transmission range into account (resulted in 9
stations with an overlapping of 88m). Secondly, the moderate
coverage (4 stations with an overlapping of 0m) achieved a
75.52% of obtained beacons. The number here was dropped
because the adversary could not cover the whole map in
where beacons were broadcasted. Finally, the low coverage (1
central station) achieved a 63.78% of obtained beacons. The
percentage here is dropped but not as much as the number
of stations was reduced. The reason behind this returns to the
mobility simulation, much road traffic was on the center of the
map which let the center have a high density compared to the
TABLE II: The evaluation of the adversary’s eavedropping
resources on the 200 vehicles density with no privacy schemes
(simple beaconing)
Scenario
(coverage mode)
Eavesdropping
stations
Received
Packets
Collection
percentage
Full 9 21.833 100%
Moderate 5 16.051 75,52%
Low 1 13.924 63,78%
other parts of the map.
6) The achieved traceability in different coverage modes:
One of the most important evaluations is the impact of the
eavesdropping stations’ number on the achieved traceability.
Basing on this, we took the 200 vehicles density scenario with
all schemes, and that is investigated in Fig. 8. The overall
results are interpreted as follows:
- With the same reasoning as in the achieved traceabil-
ity metric, SLOW was clearly the best (and the silent
period schemes in general).
- There was a significant location privacy enhancement
since the traceability was dropped for RSP, CAPS and
CPN in both of the moderate and the low coverage
modes compared to that of the full coverage mode.
- SLOW was almost at its perfect performances, how-
ever, there was a little privacy level loss in the mod-
erate then the low coverage modes respectively. We
argue this by the obtained beacons that had let the
attacker reconstruct only the available traces. Globally,
SLOW still performed well.
- Another apparent observation is the decreasing of
the location privacy level after the traceability was
augmented of all the schemes from the moderate
to the low coverage modes. Logically, reducing the
number of eavesdropping stations would reduce the
traceability. However, and like the reasoning in the
eavesdropped beacons part, the emplacement of the
single eavesdropping station was in the middle and
that was also the zone of the highest density where
most vehicles were circulating. Thus, the value of
the gathered beacons in such a zone had higher
importance in constructing the vehicles’ traces.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
A lot of observations and remarks can be drawn from
such evaluations, we recall the most influencing ones as (1)
the schemes which use the silent period mechanism provided
better privacy level (a low traceability) in one hand, and
less beacons generation and signatures verification, thus, good
QoS in the other hand. In addition for SLOW being at the
top of them. Next, (2) CPN did consume a lot of resources
(pseudonyms) with a remarkable amount compared to the
other schemes. Also, (3) the reducing of the eavesdropping
stations’ number had a negative impact on the adversary
(dropping traceability) as he could not collect much beacons in
addition for (4) being the eavesdropping stations’ emplacement
a substantial factor that effects the achieved location privacy
of the IoV users since the strategic emplacements (e.g., that
Fig. 8: The impact of the adversary’s coverage modes on the
achieved traceability by the different schemes
had higher densities) gave a higher traceability and a lower
privacy level consequently.
Still much more investigations are possible. We plan on
studying the effect of placing the eavesdropping stations on
a non-uniformly way (different emplacement combinations).
Also, bigger scale maps that necessitate more eavesdropping
stations and densities will be an important parameter. More-
over, the schemes were used with their default parameters,
we will be interested on varying such parameters to see the
resulting effects on the aforementioned metrics.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the performances of some
of the location privacy preserving schemes in a manhattan
grid model using a location privacy metric (traceability), a
bunch of QoS metrics (pseudonyms consumption, generated
beacons and verified signatures) in addition to an adversary-
side metric (eavesdropping successfulness) and described the
adversary’s used approach. The various results brought diverse
conclusions the most apparent ones are: SLOW is considered
as a good scheme under most of the performance metrics in
addition for being CPN a heavy pseudonyms consumer. Also,
the number of the adversary’s eavesdropping stations had a
negative impact on the achieved location privacy; the more
eavesdropping stations that existed the less location privacy
had been achieved. Furthermore, the emplacement of such
stations did affect the traceability metric (obviously, directly
proportional to the location privacy). This study had shown that
the adversary’s resources are an influential factor that affects
the location privacy level of the IoV users.
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